Abstract. The aim of this paper is to study cryptographic systems defined as algebras {A, +a, +0 ,p, s) of type (2,2,0,0) satisfying the axiom (x+ap)+p.s = x for all x € A. Some standard and non-standard examples of such systems are given. In particular, we study the systems for which +Q = +/3 = + and p = s where the operation + is the addition operation of a generalized Boolean quasiring (GBQR). We investigate the structure of these algebras revealing their relation to orthomodular lattices and characterize the systems for which s (which is interpreted as coding and decoding key) commutes with all elements of A. By applying direct products to cryptographic algebras one can construct complicated cryptographic systems which may be of importance for practical use. (Then the keys are sequences whose components may be selected at random like in an XOR 2 protocol.)
Introduction
Within a cryptographic protocol let x, p and s denote messages, public keys and secrete keys, respectively. Denoting the outcome of the encryption and decryption procedures by x p and x+ps, respectively, the element x has to be recovered by computing (x+ap) +ps. This motivates the following DEFINITION 1.1. A cryptographic algebra is an algebra A = (A, +a, +/j,p, s) of type (2,2,0,0) satisfying (a; +a p) +p s = x for all x 6 A. A is called symmetric if p -s; otherwise it is called nonsymmetric. If +a and coincide we write + instead of+a, +¡3. Ifp and s coincide we write s instead of p,s. If (x + s) + s = x for all x,s € A, we call (A, +) a completely symmetric cryptographic algebra.
We start by giving two well-known and a new example for cryptographic algebras in order to motivate our definition. (For notions and concepts of cryptography used in the following we refer to [9] .) Our next step will then be to introduce a whole new class of such algebras. EXAMPLE 1.1. The Vernam One-time Pad (a completely symmetric cryptosystem)
The additive group A of the two-element Boolean ring is a completely symmetric cryptographic algebra and hence the same is true for the direct power A n . Every element of A n may serve as the private as well as the public key of an individual participant. EXAMPLE 1.2. RSA (an asymmetric cryptosystem) Let 1,... ,n be participants with public keys (rrii,pi) and private keys Si,i = 1,... ,n, (rrii = aA, ai,bi different prime numbers, pi < rtii a positive integer relative prime to (a* -l)(6j -1) and s, the unique positive integer < lcm(ai -1,6» -1) satisfying Sipi = 1 mod lcm(a, -1,6, -1)). For j G {1,..., n} define Aj := {0,..., rrii -1} and x +j y := x y mod rrij for all x, y 6 Aj. Then (x +.j pj) +j Sj = x for ail x E Aj, i. e. Aj := (Aj, +j,Pj, Sj) is a cryptographic algebra. Moreover, the direct product of the algebras A\,..., An is also a cryptographic algebra which can then serve as the context for the whole RSA-system. EXAMPLE 1.3. (Cryptosystems generated by character tables of finite point symmetry groups of molecules)
Let n be a positive integer, A denote the set of all n x n-matrices over R and binary operations +Q and on A be defined as follows:
(x,y 6 A). Further let s be a fixed regular n x n-matrix over R. Then (^4, +Q, +/3, s) is a symmetric cryptographic algebra. In particular, we may consider s as the n x n-matrix of the characters of the symmetry group Q of a molecule M. It is known that the columns of this matrix correspond to the conjugacy classes of Q and the rows to the irreducible representations of Q. We denote the cardinality of the conjugacy class corresponding to the j-th column of s by Nj, j = 1,..., n, and the irreducible representation of Q corresponding to the z-th row of s by Tj, i = 1,..., n. Then it is known from the representation theory of finite symmetry groups that |s| ^ 0 and (where © denotes the direct sum) then xs corresponds to the characters of I\ If r is interpreted as a composed vibration of M then xs is the code of the vibration T in terms of the characters of I\ We may decode the vibration by using the matrix s and computing (xs)s~1 = x. Hence every molecule can be interpreted as providing a key s for coding and decoding the vibrations. Let us recall that the characters of the vibration T can be calculated from the structure of the molecule without knowing decomposition (1). Then we decode it by applying the character table s and we obtain decomposition (1). Any algebra whose type is extended by nullary operations in such a way that the extended type includes the type (2,2,0,0) or (2,0,0), respectively, can be considered as a candidate for a cryptographic algebra. In this paper our choice will be the variety of generalized Boolean quasirings (GBQRs), 
xx -Xj
xl = x and A pGBQR (R, ©, •) can be extended to a GBQR (R, +, •) by defining 0 + a; = a:4-0:=0©a;, l + a: = x + l:=lffia;foralli€i? and arbitrarily setting up x + y -y + x for all x, y 6 R \ {0,1}.
Two canonical examples for extensions of © are x +i y = 1 ffi (1 © x(l ffi y))(l ffi (1 ffi x)y) and x +2 y = (1 ffi (1 ffi x)(l ffi y))(l ffi xy) which both represent the symmetric difference in the Boolean algebras which correspond to Boolean rings. For all x,y € R we have x +1 y < x +2 y, where < is defined in L(7£). If for an extension + of © it holds that x +1 y < x + y < x +2 y for all x, y € R, we will denote this fact by simply writing +1 < + < +2-Because of the many possibilities to construct GBQRs these algebras (with respect to their operation +) qualify as candidates for cryptographic algebras. In the following we study completely symmetric and symmetric cryptographic GBQRs from the algebraic point of view. Nonsymmetric cryptograpghic GBQRs as well as considerations concerning the cryptographic strength of cryptographic GBQRs will be the subject of further investigations.
Completely symmetric cryptographic GBQRs
A completely symmetric cryptographic GBQR is characterized by the equation (x + y) + y = x for all x,y € R. Immediate consequences of this equation are x + x = 0 and x + x* -1 for all x 6 R.
We recall that for an arbitrary GBQR (R, +, •) with +i < + < +2 x<y=5>x + y = x* Ay, x>y=>x + y = xAy*, xA-y=>x + y = x\/y and x* _L y* => x + y = x* V y* where x _L y is defined by x < y* (x,y € R). (These implications hold because they are true for +1 and +2 instead of +. The operations V, A, * and the relations < and _L relate to the corresponding lattice L(7£) and will always be used in this sense in the following.) Let TZ = (i?,+, •) be an arbitrary GBQR satisfying +1 < + < +2 and assume L(7£) to be orthomodular. Then it can be easily checked that (x + y) + y = x for all those x,y € R which satisfy one of the relations x < y, x > y, x J_ y or x* _L y*.
Observing that a bounded lattice with an involutory antiautomorphism which satisfies the orthomodular law is an ortholattice we prove: LEMMA 
Let TZ = (R, +, •) be an arbitrary GBQR with the property that x + y = x* V y* for x,y € R with x* _L y*. Then (2) (x + y) + y = x for all x,y 6 R with y > x* if and only ifL(R) is orthomodular.
Proof. For all x,y € R with x* _L y*, i. e. with y > x*, we have 
If TZ = (/?,+,•) is a completely symmetric cryptographic GBQR satisfying +1 < + < +2 then L(TZ) is orthomodular. On the other
Ring-like structures
hand, given an orthomodular lattice the partial operation © of the associated pGBQR cannot always be extended to a full operation + such that the corresponding GBQR is a completely symmetric cryptographic GBQR.
Proof. Given a completely symmetric cryptographic GBQR 1Z = (R, +, •) with +1 < + < +2 and x + y -x* V y* for x, y 6 R with x* J. y*, L(7£) is orthomodular according to Lemma 2.1.
To prove the second part of the theorem suppose that there exists a completely symmetric cryptographic GBQR the corresponding lattice of which is the six-element orthomodular lattice C. Then one can obtain a contradiction by appropriately checking the equation (x + y) + y = x for various possibilities for the outcome of a + b where a, b are two different atoms of C which are not orthogonal.
• REMARK 2. A necessary condition for the existence of a geometry (P, L) is that |P|(|P| -1) = 6|L|. From this it follows |P| = 0 or 1 or 3 or 4 mod 6.
However, if + = +i or + = +2 then we end up with a Boolean ring.
THEOREM 2.2. A GBQR 7Z = (R, +, •) is a completely symmetric cryptographic GBQR satisfying + = +1 or -F = +2 if and only if it is a Boolean ring.
Proof. Assume 1Z to be a completely symmetric cryptographic GBQR satisfying + = +1 or + = +2-According to Theorem 2.1, L(7£) is orthomodular. We observe that if a € L and x C a for all x 6 L then
for all x € L. Proof. The result follows from Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 3.2.
• Theorem 3.2 shows that any GBQRs (i?, + Q , •) and (R,
•) satisfying +1 < + Q , +0 < +2 defined by means of an ortholattice that contains an element s such that x C s for all x € R can serve as an example of a cryptographic GBQR. (For the structure of such lattices cf. e. g. [7] . ) An example of a bounded lattice (L, V, A,*, 0,1) with an involutory antiautomorphism that is not an ortholattice and contains an element s ^ 0,1 such that x C s for all x € L is given in Fig. 3 .1: 
